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JUDGE AS LAW -DECLARER? 
Mitsukuni YASAKI* 
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1 Codification argument a:nd counterargument 
The legal phenomena and thinking during the latter half of nineteenth 
century in America are significant， especially for understanding the present 
situation. This period itself includes so many aspects of problems， for 
instance the rapid progress of social change mixed with the capitalistic 
development in America and so on. In the field of law， there appeared a cry 
for codification of the common law， perhaps and partly in corresponding 
with such a changing situation on the one hand， and partly by questioning of 
legitimacy of judicial (law making) power in a democratic state.1) Thus， 
D.D.Fie1d put it in the speech at Albany Law Scho01， 1885.“The present 
condition of our law isanomalous. For the main part， itis derived from the 
Common Law of England， but so mixed and belended with other rules and 
usages that it can hardly be called a system at a1l2)." From this viewpoint he 
urged law reform as follows， but it was also the same case with the preceding 
period. J. Story's remarks show an similar i1ustration of this problematic 
situation.“The question is often discussed in our day， how far it is practica-
ble to give a complete system of positive law， or a complete code of direct 
legislation. And， if practicable， the farther question arises， how far it is 
desirable， or founded in sound policy. These questions have been the subject 
* Professor of General Jurisprudence， Faculty of Law， Osaka University， L. L. D. Tokyo Uni-
versity， 1968. 
1) M.J. Horwitz， The transformation of American law， pp.256ff.， 1977. 
2) D.D. Field， Reform in the legal profession and the laws， 1885， in: The legal mind in America， 
ed. by P. Miller， p.287， 1962. 
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of ardent controversy among the civilians and jurists of the continent of 
Europe， 1iving under the civil law......In the countries governed by the 
common law， and especially in England and the United States， the same 
questions have of late been matter of wide discussion among the legal pro幽
fession， aswell as among statesmen， and a great diversity of opinion has been 
exhibited on the subject. 3)" 
To understand the passage， itmay be enough to remember Thibaut-
Savigny controversy on the Continent， Bentham's， Austin's argument for 
codification of common law in England. How about in the U.S.? One 
example will be exhibited by D.D.Field -J.C.Carter， though a stage of 
controversy between American lawyers appeared rather a bit later than the 
former two. Here， 1 merely trace some trends underlying their way of 
thinking and discussion in order to make a simple comparison with the 
present we are now faced with. 
D.D.Field energetically emphasized and planned out codification of 
common law. But he didn't imagine a complete code of law， like Panomion 
under Bentham. It will be shown by the following passage. “If it were 
assumed as essential to a code that it should contain a rule for every trans個
action that in the compass of time can possibly arise， the objection might 
have some force; but no sane person holds any such idea. We know that new 
relations will hereafter arise which no human eye has foreseen， and for which 
new laws must be made. The plan of code does not include a provision for 
every future case， in al future times; it contemplates the collecting and 
digesting of existing rules and the framing of new ones， for al that man's 
wisdom can discern of what is to come hereafter.4)" 
Then， for what purpose he proposed his plan of codification? One of 
possible purposes is tooffer certain guidance for citizen as well as for judge， 
lawyer， litigants. The other is to e1iminate uncertainty and questionable post 
facto legislative character involved in common law adjudication.“When a 
decision is made upon the Common Law， itis announced as an authoritative 
dec1aration of an existing rule; if it be not reaIly that， then the Judges， 
3) J. Story， Law， legislation and code， Appendix to VII Encyclopedia Americana (Lieber editor， 
newed.， 1835)， in: Howe， Readings in American legal history， p.460， 1949. 
4) (2) p.29lf. 
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instead of interpreting， are making law....….Judges are not the wisest 
legislators， any more than legislators are the wisest Judges. And if it were 
otherwise， there is this difference between the two modes of legislation， that 
legislation by a Legislature is made known before it is executed， while 
legislation by a court occurs after the fact， and necessarily supposes a party 
to be the victim of a rule unknown until after the transaction which calls it 
forth.S) " 
It is interesting to read this passage， because Field maintained idea of 
judge as law-declarer， law-finder in accordance with the theory of separation 
of powers in a democratic state while in reality he recognized such a 
dangerous tendency of judicial legislation. So far， Lawyers on the side of 
common law tradition are not far from Field's idea in form or theory， but in 
rea1ity.6) According to J.c. Gray， Carter held an idea of judge as law-
d eclarer even in reali ty .7) 
5) (2) p.292f. 
6)“The codes that Field had in mind would be the work of experts-men like Field himself. The 
legislature would simply take the codes and give them its stamp of validity. The codes， then， would be 
the product of a legal elite; they would be subtle and f1exible， asthe common law should have been， 
but was not， since the common law had become (unfortunately) imprisoned by history and by the 
narrow self-interest of 01φfashioned men. Carter and Field， then， agree about ends; disagre巴dabout 
means. They both valued f1巴xibilityin the la w; liked a businesslike rationality; distrusted the role of 
non伺experts，of laymen， inthe making of law. Cart巴rpreferred common-Iaw judges， asphilosopher-
kings; and looked on codes as straitてjackets. Field took the opposite view."しM.Friedmann， A 
history of American law， p.352， 1973. This is an interesting contrast， because C‘F. v. Savigny already 
figuratively wrote his relation to Thibaut's idea of codification by means of the same type of contrast， 
that is， same in their purpose， opposite in their means. "In dem Zweck sind wir einig: wir wollen 
Grundlage eines sicheren Rechts， sicher gegen Eingriff d巴rWillkuhr und ungerechter Gesinnung; des・
gleichen Gemeinschaft der Nation und Concentr且tionihrer wissenschaftlichen Bestrebungen auf 
dasselbe Object. Fur diesen Zweck verlangen sie ein Gesetzbuch， was aber di巴gewunschteEinheit nur 
fur die Halft巴vonD巴utschlandhervorbringen， die and巴reHalfte dagegen scharfer als vorher absondern 
wurde. Ich sehe das rechte Mittel in einer organisch fortschreitenden Rechtswissenschaft， die der 
ganzen Nation gemein seyn kann.“ Savigny， Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und 
Rechtswissenschaft， 1814， inThibaut und Savigny， herausg. von 1. Stern， S 12， S.166. 
7)“Mr. Carter denies that judges make Law; he says that they merely declar巴ordIscover Law 
already existing. 1 have tried to maintain the contrary， and to test the correctness of Mr. Carter's 
theory. B ut Mr. Carter goes further and denies that custom is only one of th巴sourcesof nonstatutory 
Law. He says it is the non-statutory Law itself， that it is the whole non-statutory Law. This view he 
presses with great energy." J.c. Gray， The nature and sources of the law， 1909， new and rev. e.d.， 
p.283. Cf.pp.233ff. Gray critized Carter's idea， while h巴pointedout a difference between Carter and 
W. Blackstone within a same gro 
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J.c. Carter is well known as a powerful opponent to the codification 
movement. Actually， he recognized codification， or legislation possible in 
regard to public law.8)9)10) It was the field of private law which according 
to him was alien from codification by nature.11) He wrote private law 
principally belonging to unwritten law， though maintaining a sphere for 
written law as mentioned above. Within a wider sphere of unwritten law， he 
paid a special attention to the case law， judicial precedent. “The legislator 
came， in the order of social development， after the judge， not to displace 
him， but to perform an office for which he was incompetent. The function 
of legislation is suppletory to that of the judge.12)" 
I Carter's idea of judge as law-dec1arer 
His emphasis on judicial precedent， however， comes from another source， 
that is， custom. It is because judicial precedent deeply originates from 
じustomnecessary for sociallife and it becomes a kind of evidence of custom. 
Generally speaking， what supports judicial precedent he emphasized is 
customary law. But， this is also the case for legislation， statute. Following 
the passage above cited， he wrote as follows: The function of legislation “is 
to catch the new and growing， but imperfect， customs which society is form-
ing in its unconscious effort to repress evils and improve its condition-
customs of the existence of which the judges are uncertain and at variance， 
or which are so different from former precedent that they cannot dec1are 
them without inconsistency-and to give to these formal shape and 
ratification13) ". The more to make legislation effective， the more it is 
necessary sufficiently to take account of social customs. 
The weight given to customary law may be c1ear. It is given a central 
8) J.C. Carter， Law: its origin， growth， and function， pp.230， 234， 253ff. 263ff. 
9) Carter， The provinces of the written and th巴unwrittenlaw， 24 American Law Review， pp. 
1f.， 1890. 
10) Field， Codification-Mr. Field's answer to Mr. Carter， 24 Am. L. Rev.， pp. 259f.， 1890 
11)“But what is generally intended by the believers in codification is the statement in writing not 
only of Public Law， but of al the rules of Private Law also， sothat whether we wish to know what the 
political divisions of a State， or what the duties of public officers are， or what conduct is to be 
punished as criminal， or what contracts are to be enforced， or， ingeneral， what rights may be asserted 
by one man against another， we must be guided by the statute-book". (8) pp. 264f. 
12) Carter， The ideal and the actual in the law， 24 Am. L. Rev.， p.775， 1890. 
13) (l2) p. 775. 
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position in his view of the sources of the law both to support and ground 
judicial precedent and legislation， thus custom “is the only law we discover 
at the beginning of society， or of society when first exposed to our observa-
tion 14)". It is also c1earer from this context that his emphasis on judicial 
precedent is due to its proximity to cusotmary law. 
Viewed from this perspective， he seems to use the word law in a broader 
scope inc1uding legislation， precedent， custom， and so on. Limiting our topic 
to judicial activity， a judge is surrounded by al kind of legal means 
enough to make a judicial decision through those sources of the law， even in 
hard cases. It reminds us the socalled dec1atory theory. lndeed， he pointed 
out:“That judges declare， and do not make， the law is not a fiction or a 
pretense， but a profound truth. If courts really made the law， they would 
have and feel the freedom of legislators. They could and would make it in 
accordance with their own views of justice and expediency. They would not 
in fact be bound， or feel that they wore bound， by any pre也existingla w. 1 
need not say the case is precisely contrary. They must follow the law as it 
has been before dec1ared; or， ifthe case has new features， they must decide it 
consistently . with established rules. …-・...Any judge who assumed to possess 
that measure of arbitrary power which a legislator real1y enjoys would 
c1early subject himself to impeachment1S)". 
In his main work， Law: its origin， growth， and function， Carter discussed 
the idea of J. Austin on judge's arbitrium. Judicial decision， Austin wrote， 
“must be left to the arbitrium of the judge16)"， when neither Code nor 
common law provides for new future case. This is a point which stimulates 
Carter's interest. What does judge's arbitrium mean? Does it mean judge's 
decision at his own pleasure? No， itdoesn't. To sum up what was written in 
question-answer style， his idea is like this;“The Judge is undoubtedly bound 
to make his decision according to al those considerations of human ex-
perience， sound sense， custom， right reason， conscience， equity， and justice 
14) (8) pp. 19， 173. 
15) (9) p.21. 
16) J. Austin， Lectures on jurisprud巴nce，vol. 2， 5th ed.， rev. and ed. by R. Campbell， pp. 664f.， 
656， 1885 
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which lawyers apply to such casesI7)". Then there are certain things which 
exist in the absence of al law. Certain existing things， like sound sense， 
custom， etc.， indicate the various sources of the law.“The judge then finds 
in those sources of law a rule by which he may decide the case， and when he 
finds it he is bound to apply itI8)'¥If this is what the arbitrium of the judge 
means， the judge merely finds and dec1are preexisting rule as suggested by 
the dec1atory theory. 
Of course， terms used above are various and ful of nuance. But Carter 
stressed “to consider the consequences of conduct with the view of finding 
what conduct is on the whole， most productive of the equal happiness of al 
in society， and inasmuch as the first lesson which man in society learned was 
that the greater degree of social happiness was produced by a conformity to 
custom， the real process becomes an inquiry as to what is the custom 19)". 
Various terms， that is， standards are al - natura1istically? - understood in 
the 1ight of custom. Here again， it is c1ear that custom is used as a key con-
ception (combined with his own pecu1iar view of science). 
Moreover， he added. “When this is found， itis dec1ared and enforced， 
and it is therefore the rule for the regulation of conduct which is enforced 
by society， and this is the precise definition of law.20)" Above al， itis 
Carter's idea that the judge does not make law， but merely find and dec1are 
it even in new case. 
Why Carter so much stressed on the dec1atory theory in the latter half of 
nineteenth century， that is， even after the period， when Bentham and Austin 
pointed out the fact of common law as judge-made law? It comes from his 
sense of lawyer? No. The strong representative of codification， Field， too， 
was a lawyer. Partly， itmay come from his complex interests interwoven 
with his underlying group interests. Apart from it， further question will 
be raised. 
At first glance， itconcerns with a usage of the word law or legal rule. 
When Carter speaks of judge finding and dec1aring law or rule in the various 
17) (8) p. 310. 
18) (8)p.311. 
19) (8) p. 312. 
20) (8) p. 312. 
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sources of the law， law or rule seems to be conceived ina broader .sense， 
because human experience， custom， right reason， justice， etc.， are al held 
together as various souces of the law. 
To make a comparison， we shall quote Austin's passage:“Where there is 
no rule in the system applicable to the case， the judge virtually makes one， if
he decides at al， or decides on any general ground. 
Now where the judge makes a judiciary rule， he may build it on any of 
various grounds， or derive it from any of various sources: e.g. a custom not 
having force of law， but obtaining throughout the community， or in some 
class of it， a maxim of internationallaw; his own views of what law ought to 
be (be the standard which he assumes， general utility or any other)21)円.
Austin， inthe context of this passage， seems careful in his law making 
theory by judge. Certainly， insuch and such cases， the judge may make law， 
not arbitrarily， but on the various grounds. As it well known， Austin 
classified “law" in detail， such as like proper-improper， within laws proper 
divine， positive， and positive morality. As Austin here perhaps used ‘'law" in 
the narrower sense of his laws proper， itleads to his apparent conclusion of 
judge叩madelaw， apart from the laws improper， inanother words， his broader 
usage of the word law. But， there are stil grounds to be considered from 
which th'e judge may make law. In practice， these grounds do not remind us 
of Carter's sources of the law， equity， justice， such and such? 1 don't mean 
Austin's and Carter's view similar， but there is stil a problem of the broader 
or narrower usage of the word law to be paid attention. 
The other question concerns with custom. As noticed above， custom (or 
customary law) is given a central position. 
The always existing custom offers basicmeans for finding and declaring 
law. How about a novel case? Is there any custom ready for dealing with 
such a case? To remember a catchphrase like “long established custom"， 
novelty of the case is not always followed and covered by custom establish-
ed for long period. But Carter already mentioned to “the new and growing， 
but imperfect， customs'¥ It may well apply to a novel case. Questions， 
however， will be raised about how long， in what scale of people， inwhat 
21) (16) pp. 638f 
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intensity customs are growing. Carter's idea of custom as one of sources of 
the law is followed by common difficulties as well as theory of “free law" or 
“living lawぺetc.2)
On the other hand， we can't overlook some illuminating aspects in his 
idea of custom. Often， we now are faced with the problem how to construct 
and theorize.rights on environmental matters and so on. For this purpose it 
may be useful to refer to idea of “new and growing， but， imcomplete 
customs"， let alone to study relevant legal provisions. Though Carter didn't 
consciously mention to such a new topic， we may interpret and switch his 
idea in this direction， in accordance with the way of facts-observation， 
“scientific"23) investigation he tried to take. This way of thinking， further幽
more， reminds me another aspect of the problem， that is“right" idea 
emanating from customs. Judge may find right growing as well as law or 
rule in such growing customs， for instance in connection with the problems 
of nuisance. 
11 In perspective 
Hitherto， 1 have mainly traced and commented on Carter's idea. If we 
now look around various trends of legal theories in a broader perspective， we 
again are faced with different theories of judge as law幽makeragainst such an 
idea of judge as law-finder， law-dec1arer， or oracle of law. One of the roots 
22) 1 don't rnean al theories of this sort in巴scapablefrorn such difficulties. For instance， one of 
the farnous representatives， H.U. Kantorowicz， whether succesfully or not， rnade an巴ffortto clarify 
for judge various kinds of “free" law outside of "forrnal" law， inorder to prevent to rnake an arbitrary 
decision in a case unexpected and ungoverned by the provisions of forrnal law. Kantorowicz-
Patterson， Legal science-A surnrnary of its rnethodology， 28 Colurnbia 1. Rev.， 679， 1928. 
23) Carter used terrns "science"， "scientific" in his discussion of codification-precedents-custorns， 
but sornetirnes arnbiguously. It was pointed out by R.1. Fowler.“The truth of Mr. Carter's rnost 
sweeping proposition， now urged against the Civil Code of New York， that al codification is unscienti-
fic in theory， depends rnuch on what is rneant by scientific. Science is rnost cornrnonly referable to a 
body of knowledge arranged in an orderly rnanner. To be at al relevant to the p巴ndingrneas日re，then， 
this proposition can only rnean that in its present state the cornrnon law is better arranged than in any 
code， or else， that any statutory arrangernent is unphilosophic. In order to discuss even so plain a 
proposition， itis necessary to be rid of arnbiguous terrns and， therefore， todecide in which of its con-
flicting rneanings th巴terrn“cornrnon law" as it is of extended significance， isintended to be used." 
Fowler， Codification in the State.of New York， 1884， quoted in Readings in Arnerican legal history， 
by M. Howe， p.512， 1949. 
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of the interesting contrast， theory of the “Nightrnare" and the “Noble 
Drearn24}" called by H.L.A. Hart will be found here， too， which shall be 
treated in another opportunity. 
24} H.L.A. Hart， Americanjurisprudence through English eyes， llGeorgia L. Rev.， 969，1977. 
